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Notes
DEAD END: DELAWARE'S RESPONSE TO THE RECENT
INNOVATION IN CORPORATE ANTITAKEOVER MEASURES,
THE SO-CALLED "DEAD HAND" POISON PILL, IN
CARMODY v. TOLL BROTHERS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The merger and acquisition boom of the 1980s has prompted many
companies to take defensive positions and to prepare for unsolicited take-
overs. 1 Over the past fifteen years, companies have made shareholder
rights plans, more commonly known as "poison pills," their weapon of
choice.2 Should events proceed towards a hostile takeover, a poison pill
allows the shareholders of a target company, except for the hostile bidder,
to purchase common stock of the target company at a sizeable discount
from then-market prices, thereby diluting the hostile bidder's holdings
and greatly increasing the cost of the acquisition.
3
1. See Shawn C. Lese, Note, Preventing Control from the Grave: A Proposal for
Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2175,
2175 (1996) (stating that companies have sought more powerful means to forestall
takeovers). "Unsolicited" refers to those takeovers initiated by the acquiring com-
pany against the will of the target company's board of directors, as opposed to
"friendly" or "uncontested" takeovers in which the board of directors allows the
purchase by the acquiring company. See Robert A. Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-
Tiered Tender Offers, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 389, 393 (1989) (noting variations in
takeovers).
2. See Kenneth J. Bialkin & Robert G. Wray, Legal Developments: Poison Pills,
THE M & A LAWYER, May 1998, at 12 (discussing widespread use of poison pills); To
Die For: Poison Pills, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1996, at 79 (stating that poison pills
became common in merger boom of 1980s). By May 1998, over 2,000 companies
had adopted poison pills, up from approximately 1,800 as of May 1997. See Bialkin
& Wray, supra, at 12.
When corporations first introduced poison pills, critics characterized them as
"doomsday machines" that would effectively end all contests for control of public
corporations. See ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DE-
FENSE § 5.02, at 5-15 (1995) (discussing reaction to emergence of poison pills); see
also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (noting pre-
diction of Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) that poison pills would "'de-
ter . . . virtually all hostile tender offers"'). The Delaware Supreme Court
disagreed with these critics, however, upholding the adoption of poison pills be-
cause pills would neither preclude hostile tender offers nor interfere greatly with
proxy contests. See id. (allowing use of poison pills in limited situations).
3. See Bialkin & Wray, supra note 2, at 12 (describing operation of poison pill).
Poison pills encourage a hostile bidder to negotiate with the target company's
board of directors because of limitations on the hostile bidder's ability to redeem
the pill without the board's consent. See Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner,
Shareholder Rights Plans: Recent Toxopharmacological Developments, INSIGHTS, Oct.
(643)
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Although largely successful when introduced, earlier versions of the
poison pill allowed a hostile bidder to remove the defense by electing its
own directors to the target company's board.4 In recent years, a number
of companies have responded to this tactic by adopting shareholder rights
plans that include continuing director provisions, also known as "dead
hand" provisions. 5 Dead hand provisions only allow redemption of the
poison pill rights by directors who were on the board before the pill's
adoption or who were subsequently elected with the recommendation of
the other continuing directors. 6
1997, at 2 (discussing purpose of shareholder rights plan); John Elofson, Should
Dead Hand Poison Pills Be Sent to an Early Grave?, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 303, 329-30 (1997)
(stating that with "dead hand" poison pill, raider has powerful incentive to negoti-
ate, thus giving board more time to consider offer, search for alternative course of
action and extract higher price from raider). A bidder's crossing of a specified
stock ownership threshold without board approval exemplifies a "hostile acquisi-
tion event" that would trigger a poison pill. See id.
4. See Elofson, supra note 3, at 305 (discussing importance of combined proxy
contest and tender offer to hostile bidder); Daniel A. Neff, The Impact of State Stat-
utes and Continuing Director Rights Plans, 51 U. MtAMI L. Rv. 663, 671 (1997) (stat-
ing that hostile bidders attempting takeover frequently include proxy contest to
remove target's board of directors).
The redemption feature of poison pills explains why courts have upheld them
and provides the raider's best hope for overcoming this defense. See FLEISCHER &
SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.05, at 5-82 to 83 (noting importance of redemption
feature of poison pill). All current poison pills provide that the board has the
power to redeem the rights for some nominal payment prior to the occurrence of
a triggering event. See id. § 5.05, at 5-82 (discussing operation of redemption fea-
ture of poison pill).
5. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that companies have
adopted dead hand provisions "in order to address the perceived vulnerability re-
sulting from the fact that a pill may be dismantled by replacing the target's board
of directors"); Elofson, supra note 3, at 307 (stating that dead hand poison pills
have enjoyed increased popularity with target companies because they render raid-
ers' joint proxy contests and tender offers ineffective).
Continuing director provisions have been named dead hand provisions be-
cause "people who are no longer directors ... are trying to rule from the grave."
Steven Lipin, J &J Goes to Court to Disarm Cordis of an Unusual "Pill, "WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 27, 1995, at B2 (noting origin of name for this type of shareholder rights
plan).
6. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.05, at 5-89 (discussing which
directors are considered "continuing" directors); Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at
3 (describing continuing director feature of dead hand poison pill); Elofson, supra
note 3, at 310 (defining continuing director).
In effect, a hostile bidder cannot circumvent the poison pill by waging a proxy
contest to elect directors committed to redeeming a pill because the bidder's nom-
inees, if elected, would not be "continuing directors" and thus would lack the
power to redeem the pill. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing im-
pact of continuing director provision). Some rights plans contain a more con-
servative form of dead hand provision that limits the period during which the pill
may be redeemed by continuing directors only. See id. (noting milder type of dead
hand poison pills).
644
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The validity of dead hand provisions in poison pills has caused much
debate. 7 Dead hand poison pills, however, have, received little judicial
scrutiny.8 In fact, for a while there were only two decisions that had
squarely addressed the validity of dead hand provisions, each coming to a
different result.9 Thus, both scholars and practitioners have eagerly
awaited the Delaware courts' answer to this question. 10 Recently, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery responded by rendering its decision in Carmody v.
Toll Brothers, Inc.," holding that the dead hand poison pill is subject to
legal challenge because it violates the Delaware General Corporation Law
and/or the fiduciary duties of the board of directors who adopted the
plan.' 2 This response to dead hand poison pills in Delaware could poten-
tially result in far-reaching consequences for the market in corporate
control. 13
This Note focuses on the fate of the dead hand poison pill under
Delaware law. Part II of this Note discusses the legal standard with which
7. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing arguments for and
against dead hand provisions). Opponents of continuing director provisions have
argued: (1) that they polarize the board by creating a class of directors that can
redeem the pill and one that cannot; (2) that continuing director provisions dis-
enfranchise shareholders; (3) that current directors should not have the power to
limit the discretion of future directors; and (4) that an important justification of
poison pills is that shareholders, through their power to elect directors, retain ulti-
mate control over their use. See id. On the other hand, supporters of these provi-
sions have argued: (1) that current directors already have the power to limit the
discretion of future directors (e.g., by entering the corporation into contracts); (2)
that dead hand provisions do not preclude shareholders from electing directors of
their choice; and (3) that the adoption of continuing director provisions, in states
with pill authorization statutes, falls within the powers granted to directors by such
statutes. See id.
8. See Neff, supra note 4, at 671 (stating that "[n] either courts nor commenta-
tors have yet considered in much detail the permissibility of continuing directors
provisions").
9. Compare Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485-
86 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that continuing director provision violated New York
corporate law by restricting power of board of directors without placing such re-
striction in certificate of incorporation), with Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs.,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1581-83 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that dead hand provi-
sion did not render poison pill inconsistent with Georgia law).
10. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that previous dead hand
poison pill cases left unanswered central question of whether Delaware courts will
uphold their validity); see also Neff, supra note 4, at 673 (noting that plaintiffs in
Delaware courts have raised objections to continuing director provisions on several
occasions, but no clear holding has emerged).
11. No. 15983, 1998 WL 418896 (Del. Ch. Jul. 24, 1998).
12. See id. at *1.
13. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARrozo L. REv. 511, 511-
12 (1997) (noting importance of eventual answer to questions on distribution of
power between shareholders and board of directors). The question becomes one
of balancing shareholder voting rights, a fundamental principle of corporate law,
against the board's interest in maintaining its power indefinitely. See id.
1999] NOTE
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courts analyze continuing director rights plans.14 Part III examines the
Delaware Court of Chancery's decision in Carmody, which held that "dead
hand" poison pills are subject to legal challenge. 15 Part IV advocates that
Carmody comports with the underpinning principles of Delaware corpo-
rate law. 16 Finally, Part V of this Note concludes by discussing the prob-
able impact of the Carmody decision. 17
II. BACKGROUND
A. Case Law on Dead Hand Poison Pills
Courts have had mixed reactions to continuing director provisions in
dead hand poison pills.' 8 The first case to directly address the validity of a
continuing director provision was Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank
Coip.19 There, the New York Supreme Court struck down a poison pill
that only allowed the board to redeem the rights if. (1) there was a major-
ity of the continuing directors; or (2) if the new directors immediately
succeeded continuing directors and (a) were elected by a two-thirds ma-
jority or (b) were not elected during the pendency of a merger proposal.20
According to the court, this element of the plan violated section 620 of the
New York Business Corporation Law that requires all restrictions on a
board's power to be placed in the certificate of incorporation. 2' More
14. For a discussion of the legal standard under which courts analyze continu-
ing director provisions, see infra notes 18-60 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., see infra notes 61-108 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the propriety of the Carmody ruling, see infra notes 109-
144 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the impact of Carmody, see infra notes 145-150 and
accompanying text.
18. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing dearth of case law on
dead hand poison pills). The continuing directors feature of poison pills has
largely evaded judicial review. See Lese, supra note 1, at 2192 (noting lack of au-
thority on validity of dead hand poison pills). That parties negotiate pill redemp-
tion as part of the contest's resolution, preventing the issue from reaching the
courthouse, might explain this lack of precedent. See id. That hostile bidders
sometimes abandon their efforts after the target company takes some action, such
as the sale of a valuable subsidiary or division, which dissuades the hostile bidders
from proceeding with the acquisition, further explains the lack of case law. See id.
19. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
20. See id. at 486 (enjoining use of rights plan).
21. See id. at 485 (stating that board of directors lacked authority to adopt
provision restricting action of future board). Section 620 of the New York Business
Corporation Law states:
A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law
because it improperly restricts the board in its management of the busi-
ness of the corporation, or improperly transfers to one or more share-
holders or to one or more persons or corporations to be selected by him
or them, all or any part of such management otherwise within the author-
ity of the board under this chapter, shall nevertheless be valid: (1) If all
the incorporators or holders of record of all outstanding shares, whether
or not having voting power, have authorized such provision in the certifi-
[Vol. 44: p. 643
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importantly, however, the court was concerned about the discriminatory
nature of the plan.2 2 Because the court ultimately eliminated the plan, it
seemed to mark the end of the use of dead hand poison pills.
23
Recently, however, in Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc.,24
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia up-
held a continuing director provision, ruling that the provision did not
render a poison pill inconsistent with Georgia law. 25 As a result, this case
may rekindle interest in the defense tactic even though the decision relies
cate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and (2) If, subsequent
to the adoption of such provision, shares are transferred or issued only to
persons who had knowledge or notice thereof or consented in writing to
such provision.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620(b) (McKinney 1986).
22. See Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The court stated:
The evil of [the provision] is not that it deprives a Board of certain pow-
ers; it is that it is selective in the deprivation. In other words, the present
Board members could have the powers, if they were reelected to the
Board, but the insurgents would not if they were elected by the same
plurality. Those new members of the Board approved by the current
Board would have the powers, but those not so approved would not.
Id. at 485.
According to the court, the discriminatory features of the continuing direc-
tors provision restricted the power of Irving Bank's board of directors. See id. (dis-
cussing pill's effect on power of board). In particular, the court criticized the
provision's selectivity in depriving certain boards of their directorial powers and
found that the provision discriminated among different directors depending on
the circumstances of their election. See id. at 483-84; see also Robert Todd Lang &
Robert L. Messineo, Recent Developments in Takeovers and Pending Proposalsfor Regula-
tory Changes in Acquisitions and Mergers, 609 PLI/CoRP. 909, 934 (1988) (stating that
Bank of New York court's conclusion that pill would put incumbent board in pre-
ferred position against insurgent slate clearly influenced court's decision). The
court concluded that the provision "effectively limit[ed] the powers of a future
board which is not a continuation of the present board or which is not approved
by it, while still leaving those powers to a board which is approved." Bank of New
York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 484. Because the certificate of incorporation did not enumer-
ate this, the court held that the provision violated New York law. See id. at 485
(explaining board's lack of authority to adopt provision restricting action of future
board).
23. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 533 (stating that recent compilations of tar-
get defense tactics failed to mention defense).
24. 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
25. See id. at 1579-83 (holding that board had authority to implement plan
involving poison pill without amendment to certificate of incorporation or by-laws
and adoption of by-law requiring removal of poison pill would violate Georgia stat-
ute that vests in legislature discretion to determine terms and conditions of share-
holders' rights plans). In this case, the acquirer (Invacare) initiated a hostile bid
for the target (Healthdyne), a Georgia corporation. See id. at 1579. In order to
remove the poison pill that blocked Invacare's ability to proceed with a tender
offer, it started a proxy contest to replace the target's directors. See id. The target's
poison pill contained a continuing director provision that meant the new directors
could not redeem the pill even if the acquirer succeeded in electing its slate. See
id.
5
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upon peculiar features of Georgia law. 26 In upholding the continuing di-
rector provision of the poison pill, the district court ruled that Georgia
corporate law provides directors with broad latitude and that Invacare's
proposed continuing director provision attempted to limit the discretion
of Healthdyne's board to set the terms and conditions of its shareholder
rights plan.2 7 According to the court, the continuing director provision
neither interfered with shareholder voting rights nor impermissibly lim-
ited the authority of future boards.28 Also, in Invacare, the court distin-
guished Bank of New York by noting that New York corporate law contains a
general prohibition on restrictions against the board of directors' power
to manage the corporation. 29 Further, the court acknowledged that "the
concept of continuing directors is integral to a takeover defense and is not
contrary to public policy in Georgia."3 0
B. Analysis of Dead Hand Poison Pills Under Delaware Law
Although Delaware plaintiffs have raised objections to continuing di-
rector provisions on several occasions, thus far, no clear holding has
26. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 533 (noting that in all likelihood this deci-
sion will popularize use of continuing directors provisions).
27. See Invacare, 968 F. Supp. at 1580 (stating that Georgia law provides direc-
tors with broad discretion). Section 624 of the Georgia Corporate Code states:
[N]othing contained in Code Section 14-2-601 shall be deemed to limit
the board of directors' authority to determine, in its sole discretion, the
terms and conditions of the rights, options, or warrants issuable pursuant
to this Code section. Such terms and conditions need not be set forth in
the articles of incorporation.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-624(c) (1994).
28. See Invacare, 968 F. Supp. at 1578 (rejecting Invacare's arguments that con-
tinuing directors provision violated board members' fiduciary duties and inter-
fered with shareholders' voting rights).
29. See id. at 1580 (noting that Georgia law has no such express limitation on
board's power). The court emphasized that the Bank of New York case involved a
New York statute that provided that "[a] restriction of the board's power to man-
age the business of the corporation is invalid unless (1) all of the incorporators or
all of the shareholders of record have authorized such provision on the certificate
of incorporation .... " Id. at 1580. The court stated that the Georgia Business
Corporation Code had no such express limitation within its statutory scheme. See
id. (noting that Georgia law does not require that articles of incorporation set
forth conditions and restrictions of rights agreement).
30. Id. at 1581. For example, the Georgia Fair Price statute provides that
where a vote is needed to approve a business combination, that business combina-
tion must be:
(1) Unanimously approved by the continuing directors, provided that the
continuing directors constitute at least three members of the board of
directors at the time of such approval; or (2) Recommended by at least
two-thirds of the continuing directors and approved by a majority of the
votes entitled to be cast by holders of voting shares, other than voting
shares beneficially owned by the interested shareholder who is, or whose
affiliate is, a party to the business combination.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1111 (1994).
[Vol. 44: p. 643
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emerged.3' In ascertaining how the Delaware courts should proceed re-
garding the fate of the dead hand poison pill, one should consider three
different issues: (1) the board's statutory power to adopt such a provision,
(2) the board's fiduciary duty; and (3) the limitation on shareholder vot-
ing rights.
3 2
1. The Board's Statutory Power
As a fundamental rule, a board of directors cannot act beyond its stat-
utory power.33 Under Delaware law, directors are elected by a plurality of
shareholders, the board manages the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion and board action requires a majority vote at a meeting at which a
quorum is present.3 4 Under Delaware General Corporate Law section
141 (d), the power to create voting power distinctions among directors ex-
ists only where there is a classified board and where the certificate of in-
corporation expresses those voting power distinctions.3 5 Also, section
141(d) reserves the "right to elect 1 or more directors who shall... have
such [greater] voting powers" for the stockholders, not to the directors or
a subset thereof 3 6 Thus, absent express language in the charter, a board
lacks authority to create directors with less power than other directors of
31. See, e.g., Davis Acquisition Inc. v. NWA Inc., No. CIV.A. 10761, 1989 WL
40845, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1989) (declining to resolve arguments about rights
plan that could not be redeemed for period of 180 days following election of
board with majority of noncontinuing directors); Prime Computer, Inc. v. Allen,
1988 WL 5277, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 1988) (mem.) (holding that preliminary
injunction against consent solicitation by-law adopted by target company rendered
decision on dead hand plan's legality unnecessary); see also Sutton Holding Corp.
v. DeSoto, Inc., No. 12051, 1991 WL 80223, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1991) (holding
analogous provision probably amounted to intentional attempt to coerce exercise
of shareholder franchise, thus constituting violation of directors' duty of loyalty).
32. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 536 (discussing issues Delaware courts would
consider when determining validity of dead hand poison pill).
33. See id. at 536-37 (discussing limitations on director power under Delaware
corporate law).
34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1997) (stating requirement for quorum);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1997) (stating that certificate of incorporation
must state powers and duties of directors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (1997)
(stating that board decision is by majority vote at meeting at which quorum is
present).
35. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1997) (stating that voting power dis-
tinctions must be expressed in certificate of incorporation). Section 141(d)
provides:
The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or
series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for
such term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certifi-
cate of incorporation. The terms of office and voting powers of the direc-
tors elected in the manner so provided in the certificate of incorporation
may be greater than or less than those of any other director or class of
directors.
Id.
36. Id.
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the corporation.3 7 Lastly, under Delaware General Corporate Law section
141 (a), a dead hand provision cannot impermissibly interfere with the di-
rectors' statutory power to manage the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion.38 Therefore, a dead hand provision may jeopardize a newly elected
board's ability to achieve a business combination by depriving that board
of the power to redeem the pill without obtaining the consent of the "con-
tinuing directors," who would probably constitute a minority of the
board. 39
Although the dead hand poison pill appears contrary to Delaware
statutory law, the Delaware Supreme Court took an expansive view of the
board's statutory authority to fashion takeover defenses in Moran v. House-
hold International Inc.40 The Moran court, relying on the statutory power to
37. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 537 (discussing power to create voting dis-
tinctions among directors). Also, it is important to note that "Delaware law con-
tains nothing comparable to Georgia's 'sole discretion' statutory provision on
which to base an argument for extension of the board's customary power and the
grant of superpower with respect to the fashioning of a pill." Id.
38. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (discussing directors' statutory power
to manage business and affairs of corporation); see also, e.g., Paramount Communi-
cations Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del. 1994) (recognizing
fundamental principle that board has full power to manage and direct business
and affairs of Delaware corporation). Section 141(a) provides:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chap-
ter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorpo-
ration, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of
directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent
and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
39. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 538 (discussing objections to use of dead
hand poison pill). The board cannot effectively manage the business and affairs of
the corporation because it cannot redeem the pill. See id. (discussing pill's inter-
ference with board's power to manage corporation). Thus, the dead hand provi-
sion impedes the board's ability to make future decisions. See id.
40. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding validity of poison pills). The Mo-
ran court applied the business judgment rule to the adoption of a poison pill in
the absence of a specific threat of takeover. See id. at 1350 (determining standard
of review for pre-planned defensive mechanisms). The Delaware Supreme Court
found that the directors reasonably believed Household International ("House-
hold") was vulnerable to coercive acquisition techniques and had adopted a rea-
sonable defense mechanism to protect the corporation. See id. at 1356-57
(explaining directors' entitlement to protection of business judgment rule). The
court went on to find that Household's board of directors had the authority to
adopt the poison pill rights plan and to issue the underlying preferred stock pursu-
ant to sections 157 and 151 (g), respectively, of the Delaware General Corporation
Law. See id. at 1357 (discussing board's statutory authority to adopt poison pill).
Other factors considered by the Delaware Supreme Court in examining the
Household poison pill plan included that: (1) the plan did not destroy the assets of
the issuer; (2) the implementation of the plan neither resulted in an outflow of
money from the issuer nor impaired its financial flexibility; (3) the plan did not
dilute earnings per share; (4) the plan did not have any adverse tax consequences
[Vol. 44: p. 643
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issue rights in securities for corporate finance purposes, upheld the use of
an anti-takeover measure, the "flip-over" poison pill.4 1 The court relied
upon the evolutionary conception of corporate law communicated in Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,4 2 which stated that "corporate law is not static.
It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolv-
ing concepts and needs."43
2. Fiduciary Duty
Beyond the statutory issue, a dead hand poison pill is a defensive mea-
sure that is subject to analysis under the proportionality test as outlined in
UnocaL4 4 The first prong of the Unocal test requires the target company's
board to demonstrate that, based on a reasonable investigation, it has
made a good faith determination that the acquiring company's offer
posed a threat that justified defensive maneuvers. 45 The test's second
to the issuer or its stockholders; (5) the plan did not adversely affect the market
price of the issuer's stock; and (6) the plan did not prevent proxy contests or
stockholders from banding together into a group to solicit proxies. See id. at 1354-
55.
41. See id. at 1356-57 (noting that target board had authority to issue rights
and underlying preferred stock). In Moran, the flip-over poison pill worked by
creating rights that became exercisable upon the announcement of a partial
tender offer for 30% of the target's shares. See id. at 1348-49 (discussing operation
of fights agreement). The board could redeem these rights, however, until a
raider acquired 20% of the target's shares. See id. (noting redemption provision of
rights plan). If the board did not exercise the rights, and a merger occurred, the
board could exercise them to purchase $200 of the common stock of the raider for
$100. See id. at 1349 (discussing procurement of acquiring company's shares at
reduced price). Therefore, the flip-over poison pill allows target shareholders to
purchase shares of the acquiring company in quantities equal to the amount held
by them in the target company. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2, § 5.01, at 5-
6 (discussing various types of poison pills). Boards intend this pill "to counteract
the coercive effects of a two-tiered tender offer by providing non-tendering share-
holders protection against the possibility of an inadequate back-end price." Elof-
son, supra note 3, at 315 (stating rationale behind flip-over poison pill).
42. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
43. Id. at 957.
44. See id. at 954 (discussing standard that applies to defensive measures).
The Unocal court asserted that in light of "the omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty.., before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred." Id. at 954.
The business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business deci-
sion the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."
Id. at 954; see Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341
(Del. 1987) (defining business judgment rule); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624
(Del. 1984) (stating that ordinary corporate decision-making enjoys protection of
business judgment rule); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (apply-
ing business judgment rule).
45. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (stating that incumbent directors must demon-
strate "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveness existed").
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prong requires a showing of the proportionality of the board's response to
the threat presented by the change in control.4 6 If the board's actions
satisfy the requirements of the Unocal test, the court will apply the deferen-
tial business judgment rule. 47 If the pill does not satisfy the Unocal test,
however, the court will invalidate the provision.48 The Delaware Supreme
Court rearticulated this test in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.49 The
court stated that "a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect de-
cision."5 0 According to the court, the relevant issue is whether the target
board's defensive maneuvers fall within a "range of reasonableness."5 ' A
defensive action falls outside the range of reasonableness if it can be char-
acterized as "draconian," which the court has defined as "preclusive or
coercive." 52 Thus, after Unitrin, a preclusive or coercive defensive action
will fail the second prong of the Unocal test.
53
46. See id. (stating that for defensive measure to come within ambit of busi-
ness judgment rule, board must prove that it was "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed").
47. See id. at 954-55 (stating that action satisfying both prongs of proportional-
ity test will be reviewed under business judgment rule).
48. See id.
49. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). The Unitrin court overruled a lower court's
determination that the target board's actions in defending against a hostile tender
offer were "unnecessary" and therefore "disproportionate" under the second
prong of the Unocal test. See id. at 1370. In response to the bidder's tender offer
for the stock of Unitrin (the target), the Unitrin board adopted a poison pill and
commenced a stock repurchase program. See id. at 1370-71.
50. Id. at 1385 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 45-46 (Del. 1994) (discussing standard of review for defensive meas-
ures adopted by board of directors)).
51. Id. at 1385-86. The court adopted a range of reasonableness standard be-
cause of the board's need for latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders when defending against perceived threats. See id.
at 1387 (discussing rationale for standard). But see Moore Corp. v. Wallace Com-
puter Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1562 (D. Del. 1995) (conceding that range of
reasonableness standard is meaningless because courts, when reviewing board's
defensive actions, look to whether actions are preclusive or coercive).
52. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387. The court stated that "defensive measures
which are either preclusive or coercive are included within the common law defini-
tion of draconian." Id. According to the court, a defensive action is "preclusive" if
it deprives "the stockholders of their right to receive tender offers [or] fundamen-
tally restrict[s] proxy contests . . . ." Id. A defensive act is "coercive" if it is "aimed
at 'cramming down' on . . . shareholders a management-sponsored alternative."
Id. The Unitrin court noted judicial restraint as a reason for the adoption of this
standard. See id. at 1388. Consequently, if the board of directors' defensive re-
sponse is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a range of reasona-
bleness, a court must not substitute its judgment for the board's. See id.
53. See id. at 1387 (stating that preclusive or coercive defensive measure will
fail second prong of test).
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3. Shareholder Voting Rights
The validity of anti-takeover measures is normally evaluated under the
standards set forth in Unocal and Unitrin.54 Where the defensive measures
purposefully disenfranchise shareholders, however, the burden of proof is
on the board of directors to satisfy the more exacting standard set forth in
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.55 Under the Blasius standard, "a
board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching 'upon
issues of control' that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is
strongly suspect under Unocal and cannot be sustained without a 'compel-
ling justification."' 5 6 Although the Blasius court distinguished its own test
from that of the Unocal court, later cases treated the Blasius standard as a
"specific expression" of the Unocal test.5 7 The Blasius court, addressing
the central importance of the shareholder electoral franchise, reasoned
that "[t]he shareholder electoral franchise is the ideological underpin-
54. For a discussion of the Unocal/Unitrin standard, see supra notes 44-53 and
accompanying text.
55. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). This case is considered to be the primary
authority for reviewing directors' actions that affect the stockholder franchise. See
Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial Review of Proce-
dural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 Bus. LAw 647, 654 (1992) (discussing judicial
framework for reviewing boards' actions that affect stockholder franchise).
In Blasius, the board of Atlas (the target company) attempted to prevent a loss
of control resulting from a consent solicitation that would place a majority of new
directors on its board. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 651.
56. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91-92, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (discussing stan-
dard of review for defensive measures that disenfranchise shareholders). This is
the upshot of the doctrinal development of protection of shareholder voting rights
following Blasius. See id. (noting increase in safeguards for shareholder voting).
57. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (stating that tests are not mutually exclusive
because both recognize inherent conflicts of interest that arise when shareholders
are not permitted free exercise of their franchise); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 285-86 (Del. Ch. 1989) (holding that Blasius test is
meant to be specific expression of Unocal test rather than separate, more stringent
standard); see also Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy
Contests: When is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REv. 503, 523 (1993) (argu-
ing that "[w]hile the rhetoric of the various tests . . . differs, the courts have
reached similar results under all of them, and they seem increasingly to be using
the Unocal framework to analyze incumbent defensive tactics in proxy contests").
Although "[m]any of the litigants and the courts ... have treated the Blasius
standard as requiring a more searching and critical judicial inquiry than the Uno-
cal framework," the Delaware courts have recognized that "Blasius may be viewed
as a reformulation and not necessarily an extension of Unocal in the context of
shareholder voting rights." Warren & Abrams, supra note 55, at 669 (discussing
relationship between Unocal and Blasius standards). Such commentators reason
that:
[B]y inquiring into both the incumbent directors' motives and the practi-
cal effect of their tactics on the insurgents' proxy or consent solicitation,
Blasius parallels the two-prong Unocal inquiry into the target directors'
reasonable perception of a threat to a valid corporate interest, and the
proportionality of their response to the threat.
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ning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."58 Thus, there
are special considerations present in matters involving the integrity of the
shareholder voting process that are not present in any other context in
which directors exercise delegated power.59 As a result, courts will not
apply the deferential business judgment rule when reviewing board ac-
tions designed to interfere with shareholder voting rights.
60
III. CARMODY V. TOLL 6ROTMEI.IS, INC.
A. Case Background
1. Background Leading to Adoption of the Plan
In Carmody, a shareholder of Toll Brothers, a Pennsylvania-based Del-
aware corporation that designs, builds and markets single family luxury
homes, challenged the corporation's dead hand poison pill. 6 1 Toll Broth-
ers has performed very successfully since its inception in 1967.62 After
going public in 1986, Toll Brothers continued to enjoy increased reve-
nues, and it expects that trend to continue, based on the company's ongo-
ing expansion, its backlog of home contracts and a continuing strong
industry demand for luxury housing in the regions it serves. 63
58. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (emphasizing importance of shareholder electo-
ral franchise); see Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378 ("This Court has been and remains
assiduous in its concern about defensive actions designed to thwart the essence of
corporate democracy by disenfranchising stockholders."); Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (noting that Delaware
has consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with
voting rights).
59. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (discussing importance of shareholder voting
process); see also Lese, supra note 1, at 2197 (discussing judicial review of actions
that infringe on shareholder electoral franchise).
60. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 ("[T)he deferential business judgment rule
does not apply to board acts taken for the primary purpose of interfering with a
stockholder's vote, even if taken advisedly and in good faith.").
61. See Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., No. 15983, 1998 WL 418896, at *1
(Del. Ch. Jul. 24, 1998) (noting that Toll Brothers operates in thirteen states and
five regions in United States). Brothers, Bruce Toll (Chief Executive) and Robert
Toll (Chief Operating Officer) founded Toll Brothers in 1967. See id. They own
approximately 37.5% of Toll Brothers' common stock. See id.
62. See id. (noting that as of June 3, 1997, Toll Brothers had issued and out-
standing 34,196,473 common shares that traded on New York Stock Exchange).
63. See id. (discussing Toll Brothers' ongoing expansion in luxury housing
market).
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The home building industry is highly competitive.64 Inherent in this
market is the risk of a hostile takeover.65 Thus, the board of directors of
Toll Brothers adopted a poison pill in order to protect against this risk.
66
2. The Rights Plan
The adopted Rights Plan of Toll Brothers would operate as follows:
there would be a dividend distribution of one preferred stock purchase
right (a "Right") for each outstanding share of common stock as of July
11, 1997.67 The Rights would become exercisable and would trade sepa-
rately from the common shares after the "Distribution Date," which is de-
fined as the earlier of (a) ten business days following a public
announcement that an acquirer has acquired, or obtained the right to
acquire, beneficial ownership of fifteen percent or more of the company's
outstanding common shares (the "Stock Acquisition Date"), or (b) ten
business days after the commencement of a tender offer or exchange offer
that would result in a person or group beneficially owning fifteen percent
or more of the company's outstanding common shares. 68 The dilutive
mechanism of the Rights is "triggered" by defined events. 69 Should one of
these events occur, each Rights holder (except the acquirer and its affili-
ates and associates) is entitled to buy two shares of Toll Brothers common
64. See id. (noting that for some time house construction industry has consoli-
dated through acquisition process). Over the last ten years it has evolved from
one where companies served purely local and regional markets to one where re-
gional companies have expanded to serve markets throughout the country. See id.
This consolidation was accomplished by home builders in one region acquiring
firms located in other regions. See id.
65. See id. (discussing hostile market). "For example, D.R. Horton (a Texas
firm) acquired Regency Development (an Alabama firm), Kaufman and Broad (a
California firm) acquired Oppal Jenkins Group (a New Mexico firm) and Toll
Brothers acquired Geoffrey H. Edmonds & Associates (a Phoenix, Arizona firm)."
Id. at *1 n.3.
66. See id. at *1 (discussing reasons board of directors adopted rights plan).
The Rights Plan was adopted on June 12, 1997, when Toll Brothers' stock was
trading at approximately $18 per share-near the low end of its established price
range. See id. The company announced that it had adopted the Rights Plan to
protect its stockholders from "coercive or unfair tactics to gain control of the Com-
pany" by placing the stockholders in a position of having to accept or reject an
unsolicited offer without adequate time. Id.
67. See id. at *2 (discussing operation of Rights Plan). "Initially, the Rights
would attach to the company's outstanding common shares, and each Right would
initially entitle the holder to purchase one thousandth of a share of a newly regis-
tered series Junior A Preferred Stock for $100." Id.
68. See id. (defining distribution date of rights). Once exercisable, the Rights
remain exercisable until their Final Expiration Date, which is June 12, 2007, ten
years after the adoption of the Plan, unless the Rights are earlier redeemed by the
company. See id.
69. See id. (discussing events that would "trigger" Rights Plan). One trigger
event is the acquisition of 15% or more of Toll Brothers' stock by any person or
group of affiliated or associated persons. See id.
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stock or other securities at half price. 70 As a result, this so-called "flip in"
feature of the Rights Plan would substantially dilute the value of the hos-
tile acquirer's holdings.7 1
The Rights also have a standard "flip over" feature that is triggered if,
after the Stock Acquisition Date, the company is made a party to a merger
in which Toll Brothers is not the surviving corporation, or in which it is
the surviving corporation and its common stock is changed or ex-
changed. 72 In either event, each Rights holder becomes entitled to
purchase common stock of the acquiring company, again at half price,
thereby impairing the acquirer's capital structure and massively diluting
the interest of the acquirer's other stockholders. 73
James Carmody, individually and on behalf of shareholders of Toll
Brothers, alleged that the purpose and effect of the company's Rights
Plan, as with most poison pills, was to make any hostile acquisition of the
company prohibitively expensive, in order to deter such acquisitions, un-
less the target company's board approved the acquisition proposal.74
Substantively, the dead hand provision prevented any directors of Toll
Brothers, except those who were in office on the plan's date of adoption
(June 12, 1997) or their chosen successors, from redeeming the Rights
70. See id. (noting entitlement of each rights holder). The value of the stock
received when the Right is exercised is equal to two times the exercise price of the
Right. See id.
71. See id. The "flip-in" feature of a rights plan is triggered when the acquirer
crosses the specified ownership threshold, regardless of the acquirer's intentions
with respect to the use of the shares. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2,
§ 5.01, at 5-7 (discussing various types of poison pills). When the threshold is
crossed, the rights vest in all shareholders other than the acquirer, and as a result,
those holders become entitled to acquire additional shares of voting stock at a
substantially discounted price, usually about half of the market price. See id. (dis-
cussing features of flip-in poison pill).
72. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *2 n.5 (discussing "flip-over" feature of
Rights Plan). Commonly, rights plans contain a "flip-over" feature entitling target
company shareholders (other than the acquirer) to purchase shares of the acquir-
ing company at a reduced price. See FLEISCHER & SussMAN, supra note 2, § 5.01, at
5-7 (discussing various types of poison pills). That feature is activated when, after a
"flip-in" triggering event, the acquirer initiates a triggering event, such as a
merger, self-dealing transaction, or sale of assets. See id.
73. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896 at *2 (noting dilutive feature of "flip-over"
aspect of Rights Plan).
74. See id. The target board's "leverage" comes from another critical feature
found in most rights plans: the directors' power to redeem the rights at any time
before they expire, on such conditions as the directors "in their sole discretion"
may establish. See id. (noting board's power to redeem rights). In this respect,
Toll Brothers' Rights Plan is similar to the "standard model" rights plan. See id.
(stating similarity between Toll Brothers' poison pill and most other poison pills).
This Rights Plan is distinctive because it authorizes only a specific, defined cate-
gory of directors to redeem the Rights. See id. (stating difference between Toll
Brothers' poison pill and most other poison pills). The focus of this lawsuit is the
legality of the "continuing director" or dead hand feature of the Rights Plan. See
id.
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until they expire on June 12, 2007.75 According to the complaint, this
dead hand provision had a twofold practical effect.7 6 First, it made any
unsolicited offer for the company less likely by eliminating a proxy contest
as a useful way for a hostile acquirer to gain control because even if the
acquirer wins the contest, its newly elected directors could not redeem the
Rights. 77 Second, the dead hand provision disenfranchised, in a proxy
contest, all shareholders that wanted the company to be managed by a
board empowered to redeem the Rights by depriving those shareholders
of any practical choice except to vote for the incumbent directors.78
Given these effects, Carmody claimed that the only purpose that the dead
hand provision could serve was to discourage future acquisition activity
that would result in an adverse effect on the company's stock.79
B. The Delaware Court of Chancery's Analysis
The critical issue on this motion to dismiss under Delaware Court of
Chancery Rule 12(b) (6) was whether a dead hand provision in a poison
pill rights plan was subject to legal challenge on the basis that it was invalid
as ultra vires or as a breach of fiduciary duty, or both.80 The court held
that the dead hand feature of the rights plan was subject to legal challenge
on both statutory and fiduciary grounds and that because the complaint
stated legally cognizable claims for relief, the pending motion to dismiss
75. See id. at *3 (discussing dead hand feature of Rights Plan). The Rights
Agreement's definition of a "Continuing Director" is:
(i) any member of the Board of Directors of the Company, while such
person is a member of the Board, who is not an Acquiring Person, or an
Affiliate [as defined] or Associate [as defined] of an Acquiring Person, or
a representative or nominee of an Acquiring Person or of any such Affili-
ate or Associate, and was a member of the Board prior to the date of this
agreement, or (ii) any Person who subsequently becomes a member of
the Board, while such Person is a member of the Board, who is not an
Acquiring Person, or an Affiliate [as defined] or Associate [as defined] of
an Acquiring Person, or a representative or nominee of an Acquiring Per-
son or of any such Affiliate or Associate, if such Person's nomination for
election or election to the Board is recommended or approved by a ma-
jority of the Continuing Directors.
Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. (noting that unsolicited offer will be more unlikely due to dead
hand provision).
78. See id. (noting that dead hand provision will disenfranchise shareholders).
79. See id.
80. See id. A motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) will
not be granted unless the Court is reasonably certain that the plaintiff would not
be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could reasonably be inferred from
the complaint. See id. (citing Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099,
1105 (Del. 1985)). In that procedural setting, the truth of all well-pleaded allega-
tions in the complaint is assumed. See id. (citing Solomon v. Pathe Communications
Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 (Del. 1996)). Thus, on this motion the focus of the inquiry
is not whether the Rights Plan is invalid, but rather, the focus is only whether the
complaint states one or more cognizable claims of legal invalidity. See id.
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had to be denied.81 The Delaware Court of Chancery began its analysis by
easily disposing of Toll Brothers' threshold arguments that (a) the claims
were not ripe and (b) even if ripe, the claims must be dismissed because
they were derivative.8 2 The Delaware Court of Chancery then turned to
the most critical issue in the case-the validity under Delaware law of the
dead hand feature of the Toll Brothers rights plan.8 3
In the end, the court concluded that the complaint's three reasons
why the dead hand provision violated Delaware statutory law were legally
81. See id. at *1 (holding that dead hand feature is subject to legal challenge
on both statutory and fiduciary grounds).
82. See id. at *6 (disposing of defendant's ripeness and derivative arguments).
Toll Brothers' argued that the plaintiffs claims were not ripe and could not
become ripe for adjudication, unless and until (i) a specific acquisition is pro-
posed to which the Continuing Directors object and (ii) the Continuing Directors
refuse to redeem the Rights so as to enable the shareholders to consider the acqui-
sition proposal and decide whether or not to accept it. See id. at *5. The court
agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the "dead hand" provision has a present
depressing and deterrent effect upon the shareholders' interests, in particular, the
shareholders' present entitlement to receive and consider takeover proposals and
to vote for a board of directors capable of exercising the full array of powers pro-
vided by statute, including the power to redeem the poison pill. See id. at *6. The
court reasoned that the plaintiff's claims of statutory and equitable invalidity are
ripe for adjudication because of their alleged current adverse impact. See id.; see
also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1072 (Del. 1985) (dismissing
similar ripeness argument).
In addition, Toll Brothers argued that the invalidity claims were derivative and
should be dismissed under Chancery Court Rule 23.1, because the plaintiff failed
to make a pre-suit demand on the board or plead facts that would excuse a de-
mand. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *7. Delaware Court Chancery Rule 23.1
states:
In a derivative action brought by I or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation . . . the complaint shall allege that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of
which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership
thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law. The complaint
shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort.
DEL. R. CH. CT. 23.1 (1997). The court determined that the plaintiff's claims were
individual, not derivative. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *7 (discussing defense
to derivative claim). The court reasoned that because the shareholders' right to
vote is a contractual right and an attribute of the Toll Brothers shares, the claimed
wrongful interference with that right stated an individual cause of action. See id.
(deciding claims were individual); see also Lipton v. News Int'l, Plc, 514 A.2d 1075,
1079 (Del. 1986) (stating that interference with shareholder voting rights states
individual cause of action). Even if the claims were derivative, the court deter-
mined that the complaint's allegations were sufficient to excuse compliance with
the demand requirement of Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1. See Carmody,
1998 WL 418896, at *7 (noting claim satisfies requirements for demand excusal).
83. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *8 (stating critical issue of case is validity
of dead hand provision under Delaware law).
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sufficient claims. 84 First, under Delaware General Corporate Law section
141(d), the power to create voting power distinctions among directors ex-
ists only where there is a classified board and where those voting power
distinctions are expressed in the certificate of incorporation. 8 5 The Toll
Brothers rights plan, violated this law because it "confer[ed] the power to
redeem the pill only upon some, but not all, of the directors."86 Second,
the right to elect directors with greater voting powers is reserved to the
shareholders under section 141(d). 87 Because the continuing directors
have the exclusive power to redeem the pill, the statutorily protected
shareholder right to elect directors who would have this power is vio-
lated.88 Third, Delaware General Corporate Law section 141(a) gives di-
rectors the statutory power to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation.8 9 This power may be violated because the dead hand provi-
sion would jeopardize a newly elected future board's ability to achieve a
business combination by depriving that board of the power to redeem the
84. See id. at *9 ("[T]he complaint states legally sufficient claims that the
'dead hand' provision of the Toll Brothers Rights Plan violates 8 Del. C. §§ 141 (a)
and (d).").
85. See id. (discussing power to create voting distinctions under § 141(d)).
86. Id. at *9. Under Delaware law, if one category or group of directors is
given distinctive voting rights not shared by the other directors, those distinctive
voting rights must be set forth in the certificate of incorporation. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1997) (requiring voting power distinctions to be set forth in
certificate of incorporation). The complaint alleged that this distinction was not
set forth in the certificate of incorporation. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *9
(discussing dead hand pill's non-compliance with Delaware statutory law).
87. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *9 ("[Section] 141(d) mandates that the
'right to elect 1 or more directors who shall ... have such [greater] voting powers'
is reserved to the stockholders .... ") Absent express language in the charter,
nothing in Delaware law suggests that some directors of a public corporation may
be created less equal than other directors, and certainly not by unilateral board
action. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 537 (discussing power to create voting dis-
tinctions under Delaware law).
88. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *9 ("Vesting the pill redemption power
exclusively in the Continuing Directors transgresses the statutorily protected share-
holder right to elect the directors who would be so empowered.").
89. See id. at *10.
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pill. 90 The court stated that its statutory analysis and result were consistent
with and supported by Bank of New York.9 1
90. See id. (noting that replacing board could make pill redemption legally
impossible). The dead hand poison pill interferes with the board's power to pro-
tect the corporation's (and its shareholders') interests in a takeover transaction
that is one of the most fundamental and important in the life of a business enter-
prise. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 538 (stating that "[s]uch interference turns on
its head the very rationale of the poison pill, which is to protect the board against
alleged encroachments on that power from a hostile bid").
Toll Brothers offered two arguments in response to the statutory invalidity
claims. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *11. First, they contended that the Rights
Plan did not facially preclude or interfere with proxy contests as a means to gain
control or coerce shareholders to vote for or against any particular director slate.
See id. Second, Toll Brothers argued that the dead hand provision is analogous to
a delegation to a special committee, consisting of the "continuing directors," of the
power to redeem the pill. See id. The court found that neither contention had
merit. See id. The first contention was basically an argument that the Rights Plan
does not violate any fiduciary duty of the board. See id. (characterizing arguments
in response to statutory invalidity claim). According to the court, the fiduciary
duty argument is unresponsive to the statutory invalidity claim. See id. The second
argument rested upon an analogy that has no basis in fact. See id. (stating that
"special committee" analogy ignores fundamental structural differences between
creation of special committee and operation of dead hand provision). The court
noted that the board's actions did not create a special committee having the exclu-
sive power to redeem the pill. See id.
91. See id. at *10 (discussing consistent case law). In Bank of New York, the
court found that the continuing director provision violated the New York Business
Corporation Law requirement that restrictions upon the board's powers are inva-
lid, unless all the incorporators or all shareholders of record authorize the inclu-
sion of the limitations or restrictions in the certificate of incorporation. See Bank
of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (hold-
ing that board was without authority to adopt provision restricting action of future
board). The Carmody court recognized that the underlying intent of the Delaware
and New York statutes was the same because both statutes require that limitations
upon the directors' power be expressed in the corporation's charter. See Carmody,
1998 WL 418896, at *10 (discussing similarities between Delaware and New York
statutory law). Like the poison pill in Bank of New York, it is alleged that Toll Broth-
ers' pill is invalid because the certificate of incorporation does not contain any
limitation upon the power of the board. See id. (noting similarity between Toll
Brothers' pill and dead hand pill struck down in New York).
The court also distinguished Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Tech., Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997), a case that Toll Brothers relied upon. See Carmody,
1998 WL 418896, at *11 n.38. In Carmody, the court stated:
[T] he [Invacare] court held that the Georgia Business Corporation Code
had no statutory requirement mandating that limitations on the direc-
tors' power be expressed in the certificate of incorporation. That court
noted that the Georgia statute gave the board "sole discretion" to deter-
mine the terms and conditions of a rights plan, and that the Official
Comment stated that the board's discretion is limited only by its fiduciary
obligations to the corporation. The court also found that the Georgia
Fair Price statutory provision, which required unanimous approval by the
"continuing directors" or recommendation by at least two thirds of the
"continuing directors" and approval by a specified percentage of share-
holder votes, supported the conclusion that "Georgia corporate law em-
braces the concept of continuing directors as part of a defense against
18
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Next, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the complaint
stated a legally sufficient claim that the dead hand provision purposefully
interferes with the shareholder voting franchise without any compelling
justification, and is therefore unlawful under the Blasius standard. 92 The
court found that "[t]he disenfranchisement would occur because even in
an election contest fought over the issue of a hostile bid, the shareholders
will be powerless to elect a board that is both willing and able to accept the
bid."93 The court took into account the Delaware Supreme Court's ration-
ale for upholding the validity of the poison pill in Moran v. Household Inter-
national Inc.94 In Moran, the court reasoned that the effect of the poison
pill upon a proxy contest would be minimal, and if the board refused to
redeem the pill, the shareholders could then elect directors who would
redeem it.95 The Carmody court also relied upon the primacy of the share-
holder vote in the scheme of Delaware corporate jurisprudence. 96 The
court described the primacy of shareholder vote as the "ideological under-
pinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."9 7
hostile takeovers." The relevant Delaware corporate statutory scheme,
like New York's, differs materially from that of Georgia.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *11 (concluding there is legally cogniza-
ble claim that dead hand provision purposefully interferes with shareholder vot-
ing). Where the defensive measures purposefully disenfranchise shareholders, the
board will be required to satisfy the more exacting Blasius standard, which the
Delaware Supreme Court has articulated as follows:
A board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching
.upon issues of control" that purposefully disenfranchises its sharehold-
ers is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot be sustained without a
"compelling justification."
Id. at *12 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)).
93. Id. at *12 (discussing pill's effect of coercing shareholders to vote for in-
cumbent directors that have full statutory power). See also Gordon, supra note 13,
at 540 (stating that claim that directors have unilaterally "create[d] a structure in
which shareholder voting is either impotent or self defeating" is claim of pur-
poseful disenfrachisement).
94. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *12 (discussing rationale for upholding
validity of poison pill); see also Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355
(Del. 1985) (upholding validity of poison pills).
95. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *12 ("In Moran, the Supreme Court up-
held the adoption of a poison pill, in part because its effect upon a proxy contest
would be 'minimal,' but also because if the board refused to redeem the plan, the
shareholders could exercise their prerogative to remove and replace the board.").
The court also looked to Unocal where the Delaware Supreme Court reiter-
ated the view that the safety valve that justifies a board being allowed to resist a
hostile offer that a majority of the shareholders might prefer is because the share-
holders always have their ultimate recourse to the ballot box. See id. (citing Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) ("If the shareholders are
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.")).
96. See id.
97. Id. at *12; see Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378
(Del. 1995) (stating that defensive actions designed to thwart essence of corporate
democracy by disenfranchising stockholders require close judicial scrutiny); Para-
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Finally, the court concluded that the complaint stated a legally cogni-
zable claim that the inclusion of the dead hand provision in the rights
plan was an unreasonable defensive measure in violation of the board's
fiduciary duty.9 8 Under Unocal, a fiduciary duty claim requires enhanced
judicial scrutiny. 99 Thus, the board has the burden of establishing for the
court that (1) "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness existed" and (2) that its "defensive response
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'0 0 Enhanced scrutiny is
not satisfied by resting on a defense motion attacking the pleadings.10 1
Only conclusory complaints may be dismissed early. 10 2 The court, how-
ever, found that the complaint was "far from conclusory." 103 Under Uni-
trin, a defensive measure is unreasonable if it is either coercive or
preclusive. 10 4 The court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the plan was coercive because the complaint stated that the dead hand
provision forced shareholders to vote for incumbent directors if share-
holders wanted to be represented by a board with full statutory author-
ity. 10 5 The court also found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that
the plan was preclusive. 10 6 It was preclusive, according to the complaint,
mount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
(noting that Delaware courts consistently act to protect stockholders from unwar-
ranted interference with voting rights).
In support of this proposition, the Carmody court quoted former Chancellor
William T. Allen:
Provisions in corporate instruments that are intended principally to re-
strain or coerce the free exercise of the stockholder franchise are deeply
suspect. The shareholder vote is the basis upon which an individual serv-
ing as a corporate director must rest his or her claim to legitimacy. Ab-
sent quite extraordinary circumstances, in my opinion, it constitutes a
fundamental offense to the dignity of this corporate office for a director
to use corporate power to seek to coerce shareholders in the exercise of
the vote.
Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *12 (quoting Sutton Holdings Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., No.
12051, 1991 WL 80223, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1991)).
98. See Carmody, 1998 WL 418896, at *13.
99. See id. Enhanced judicial scrutiny is, by its nature, fact-driven and requires
a factual record. See id. (discussing standard of review for fiduciary duty claims).
100. Id. at *13 (citing Unoca4 493 A.2d at 955 (discussing board of directors'
burden of proof)).
101. See id. (stating that enhanced scrutiny "will usually not be satisfied by
resting on a defense motion merely attacking the pleadings" (quoting In re Santa Fe
Pacific Corp., 669 A.2d 59, 72 (Del. 1995))).
102. See id. (stating that only "conclusory complaints without well-pleaded
facts may be dismissed early under Chancery Rule 12" (quoting In re Santa Fe Pa-
cific Corp., 669 A.2d at 72)).
103. Id.
104. See id. (discussing standard under Unitrin).
105. See id. (stating that complaint alleges that dead hand provision "disen-
franchises shareholders by forcing them to vote for incumbent directors or their
designees if shareholders want to be represented by a board entitled to exercise its
full statutory prerogatives").
106. See id.
662 [Vol. 44: p. 643
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss4/3
1999] NoTE 663
because it made a bidder's ability to wage a successful proxy contest and to
gain control either "mathematically impossible" or "realistically unattaina-
ble."1 0 7 Thus, the court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to
state a claim that Toll Brothers' rights plan was disproportionate and un-
reasonable under the Unocal/Unitrin standard.' 0 8
IV. CRITMIAL ANALYSIS
The Delaware Chancery Court held that a dead hand poison pill
rights plan was subject to legal challenge on the basis that it violated the
Delaware General Corporation Law and/or the fiduciary duties of the
board of directors who adopted the plan. 10 9 This Note suggests that the
Delaware Chancery Court was correct in its ruling because the result is
consistent with underpinning principles of Delaware corporate law. First,
the Delaware Chancery Court correctly interpreted Delaware statutory law
with respect to dead hand poison pills.1 10 Second, dead hand poison pills
infringe on the shareholder electoral franchise."' Finally, the dead hand
provision violates the fiduciary duty of the board of directors."12
A. Dead Hand Poison Pills Violate Statutory Power
Dead hand poison pills fail on many statutory grounds relevant to the
powers and restrictions conferred upon boards of directors." 13 Under a
dead hand poison pill, only certain directors will be qualified to exercise
the power to redeem a pill. 1 14 Under Delaware law, however, director
107. Id. The complaint alleges that the provision makes an offer for Toll
Brothers much more unlikely because it eliminates the use of a proxy contest as a
possible means to gain control; thus, any directors elected in such a contest would
be unable to redeem the pill. See id. Also, it was alleged that the dead hand pill
made "future contests for corporate control of Toll Brothers prohibitively expen-
sive and effectively impossible." Id.
108. See id. (concluding that allegations were sufficient to state claim that plan
was disproportionate and unreasonable).
109. See id. at *1 (holding that dead hand feature of rights plan is subject to
legal challenge on both statutory and fiduciary grounds).
110. For a further discussion of the Delaware statutory issues that arise with
respect to dead hand poison pills, see supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
111. For a further discussion of the law that applies to defensive measures
that disenfranchise shareholders, see supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
112. For a further discussion of the board's fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
113. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 3 (stating arguments against validity
of poison pills). The main statutory arguments against the validity of dead hand
provisions are that they create two classes of directors and that current directors
should not have the power to limit the discretion of future directors. See id. (re-
viewing statutory arguments against dead hand poison pills).
114. See Bialkin & Wray, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing power to redeem dead
hand poison pill); Elofson, supra note 3, at 309-10 (discussing mechanics of dead
hand pills).
Under a dead hand poison pill, only directors in place at the time of the pill's
adoption or who were subsequently elected with the recommendation of the other
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qualifications can only be established in the certificate of incorporation or
the bylaws of the corporation, neither of which are tactically available in
the case of a dead hand poison pill. 115 Thus, a dead hand pill gives voting
rights to some directors and not others.1 16 Absent express language in the
certificate, however, a board is without authority to create directors with
different levels of power.
1 17
Proponents of dead hand poison pills argue that current directors do
in fact have the power to limit the discretion of future directors due to
their ability to legally bind the corporation in contracts. 11 8 This power,
continuing directors can redeem the pill. See Bialkin & Wray, supra note 2, at 2
(discussing continuing director qualifications).
115. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (b) (1997) (stating director qualifications
can only be stated in articles or bylaws). Section 141(b) states:
The board of directors of a corporation shall consist of 1 or more mem-
bers. The number of directors shall be fixed by, or in the manner pro-
vided in, the bylaws, unless the certificate of incorporation fixes the
number of directors, in which case a change in the number of directors
shall be made only by amendment of the certificate. Directors need not
be stockholders unless so required by the certificate of incorporation or
the bylaws. The certificate of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe
other qualifications for directors.
Id.
Establishing director qualifications in the certificate or bylaws would not be
tactically available in this case because even though the various statutory elements
may be altered by the articles, or in some cases the bylaws, a dead hand poison pill
is unlikely to obtain shareholder approval as a certificate amendment and, if
adopted as a bylaw, would presumably be subject to both shareholder power and
the power of a successor board to amend bylaws. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 537
(discussing reasons for lack of director qualifications in articles or bylaws for dead
hand poison pills).
116. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that dead hand poison
pills create two classes of directors).
The power to create voting distinctions among directors, however, appears to
be available only in the case of a classified board and only when specified in the
certificate of incorporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1997) (discussing
voting distinctions among directors). Section 141 (d) states:
The certificate of incorporation may confer upon holders of any class or
series of stock the right to elect 1 or more directors who shall serve for
such term, and have such voting powers as shall be stated in the certifi-
cate of incorporation. The terms of office and voting powers of the direc-
tors elected in the manner so provided in the certificate of incorporation
may be greater than or less than those of any other director or class of
directors.
Id.
117. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 537 (stating that under Delaware law direc-
tors are created equal). In contrast to Georgia's "sole discretion" statutory provi-
sion, Delaware General Corporation Law does not provide for the extension of a
board's power in fashioning a pill. See id. (noting peculiar feature of Georgia law
that changes statutory analysis).
118. See Brown & Regner, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that board may have some
power to limit discretion of future board as incidental consequence of corporate
contract). For example, a board can enter a corporation into a covenant that con-
tains a loan agreement that restricts the corporation's right to issue dividends. See
id. (noting board's power to bind corporation under certain contracts).
[Vol. 44: p. 643
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however, is subject to constraint. 119 Agreements limiting the discretion of
a future board would violate that board's statutory power to appoint and
remove officers and to direct the management of the corporation. 120
Thus, the dead hand poison pill is objectionable because its very purpose
is to interfere with a future board's power to manage by limiting the future
board's discretion. 12 1 Also, because the future board cannot redeem the
pill, the dead hand poison pill directly interferes with the future board's
core statutory power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 122 This inter-
ference is at odds with the very rationale of the poison pill, which is to
119. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 537. For example, a board cannot limit its
discretion or the discretion of a future board to fire a chief executive officer or to
enter into a contract that would eliminate that discretion due to potential damages
that would result from the chief executive officer's termination. See id. at 538 (not-
ing extent to which board can limit discretion of future board); see also, e.g.,
Grimes v. Donald, CIV.A. No. 13358, 1995 WL 54441, at *9 (Del. Ch.Jan. 11, 1995)
(holding that although board may delegate powers subject to possible review, it
may not abdicate them), affd, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).
120. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (1997) (giving board power to ap-
point and remove officers). Section 142(b) states:
Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall hold their offices for
such terms as are prescribed by the bylaws or determined by the board of
directors or other governing body. Each officer shall hold office until
such officer's successor is elected and qualified or until such officer's ear-
lier resignation or removal. Any officer may resign at any time upon writ-
ten notice to the corporation.
Id. Section 141(a) gives the board power to direct management of the corpora-
tion. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1997). Section 141(a) states:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chap-
ter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorpo-
ration, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of
directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent
and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of
incorporation.
Id.; see Chapin v. Benwood Found., Inc., 402 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979)
(holding that directors of Delaware corporation may not delegate to others those
duties that lay at heart of management of corporation), affd sub nom., Harrison v.
Chapin, 415 A.2d 1068 (Del. 1980); Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899
(Del. Ch. 1956) (discussing prejudice against agreements that remove from direc-
tors their duty to use own best judgment on management matters).
121. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 538 (discussing statutory objections to dead
hand poison pills).
The board's purpose in adopting a dead hand provision is to protect the cur-
rent board's incumbency. See id. (discussing rationale behind adoption of dead
hand pill). The entrenchment actions of the current board constitute unwar-
ranted interference with a future board's power to manage. See id. (recognizing
limitation on future board's discretion).
122. See id. (stating that dead hand poison pill will interfere with future
board's capacity to accomplish business combination).
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protect the board's power to manage the corporation. 123 Also, a dead
hand provision may make it impossible for a future board "to select... a
time frame for the achievement of corporate goals," and in this way would
violate fundamental principles of Delaware corporate law. 124 For these
reasons, the Delaware Chancery Court was correct when it found that the
complaint stated legally sufficient claims that the dead hand provision of
the Toll Brothers rights plan violated Delaware General Corporate Law.125
B. Dead Hand Poison Pills Infringe on Shareholder Voting Rights
In addition, the Delaware Court of Chancery was correct in ruling
that the complaint stated a legally cognizable claim that the dead hand
poison pill purposely disenfranchised shareholders without any compel-
ling justification and was therefore unlawful under the Blasius standard. 126
The strongest defense of the use of a poison pill is that the shareholders
ultimately have the option of electing a new board if they are unsatisfied
with the judgment of the present board. 127 This defense is consistent with
the Delaware Supreme Court's rationale for upholding poison pills.1 28 A
board's decision to adopt a dead hand pill disenfranchises shareholders
because it strips shareholders of their right to participate in proxy con-
tests, and this may allow them to elect a board that would further their
interests. 129 Indeed, a continuing director provision corrupts the free
123. See id. (stating that dead hand provision is inconsistent with rationale
supporting poison pills); see also Lese, supra note 1, at 2176 (stating that dead hand
pills are effective deterrents of hostile takeovers).
124. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1989) (confirming primacy of business judgment of board of directors). The
failure to select a time frame for the achievement of corporate goals is a violation
of the board's fiduciary duties. See id. (discussing management of corporate
enterprise).
125. See Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., No. 15983, 1998 WL 418896, at *9
(Del. Ch. Jul. 24, 1998) (holding that complaint stated legally sufficient claims that
dead hand provision violated Delaware statutory law).
126. See id. at *11 (holding that complaint states legally cognizable claim that
dead hand provision purposely interferes with shareholder voting franchise with-
out any compelling justification).
127. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 539 (discussing poison pill's effect on
shareholder voting).
128. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985)
(recognizing importance of ability of displeased shareholders to elect new board);
Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (drawing the line
at poison pill that "fundamentally restricts proxy contests").
129. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 540 (discussing disenfranchisement effect
of dead hand provisions in poison pills). The fact that reelected incumbent direc-
tors might change their view or that the pill eventually will expire are not answers
to this issue. See id. (discussing disenfranchisement effect). In addition, the coer-
cive structure that may lead shareholders to reelect incumbents (because only they
can redeem the pill) may also give incumbents a false sense of support for their
policies. See id. (same).
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choice that is closely associated with the idea of voting.' 30 In previous
cases, Delaware courts have found disenfranchisement where the timing
of elections was manipulated.13 1 Therefore, a defensive mechanism that
renders shareholder voting worthless constitutes disenfranchisement. 13 2
Proponents of dead hand poison pills have argued that they defend
against a raider's coercive dealings and thus are necessary to protect share-
holders. 13 3 Under this view, the board's primary purpose in using the pro-
vision against a hostile bidder's proxy contest is to protect shareholders
from the coercive impact of a tender offer, rather than thwarting the solic-
itation.13 4 This risk of coercion, however, is minimal.' 35 When sharehold-
ers are faced with a takeover attempt that utilizes a joint tender offer and
voting contest, they simply would not vote for the dissident unless they
freely supported its agenda.' 3 6 Thus, dead hand provisions serve no pur-
130. See id. (stating that shareholders will be forced to vote for directors with
full power). The shareholders' free choice can be corrupted in three ways: "first,
where the shareholders vote against the acquirer's slate because only continuing
directors have the power to redeem the pill and accomplish a near-term transac-
tion; second, where the shareholders vote only for some of the acquirer's candi-
dates but for a majority of incumbent candidates for the same reason (and with the
hope of sending a signal); and third, where in response to this strategic dilemma,
the acquirer runs only a partial slate." Id. at 540 n.122.
131. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 437 (Del. 1971)
(holding management's utilization of corporate machinery and Delaware law for
purpose of perpetuating itself in office and, to that end, its advancement of date of
stockholders' meeting, for purpose of obstructing legitimate efforts of dissident
stockholders in exercise of their rights to undertake proxy contest against manage-
ment constituted inequitable purposes that would not be allowed); Aprahamian v.
HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding that decision to post-
pone annual stockholder meeting recommended by special committee appointed
by incumbent board disenfranchised stockholders).
132. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 539 (claiming dead hand poison pills
clearly disenfranchise shareholders).
133. See Lese, supra note 1, at 2203 (discussing justifications for dead hand
poison pills set forth by incumbent boards). By retaining the power to revoke the
pill, incumbent boards can thwart hostile tender offers. See id.
134. See id. (recognizing view that board's primary purpose in using dead
hand provision is to defend against coercive impact of tender offer). This justifica-
tion is particularly problematic because Delaware courts have invalidated poison
pills when they interfere with proxy contests. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No.
11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (stating that "the side in
control of the levers of power [during a voting contest could not] employ them
with respect to an election to coerce its opposition to restrict its legitimate elec-
tioneering activities"); Sutton Holding Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., No. 11221, 1990 WL
13476, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990) (invalidating pill that was triggered when
shareholder receives proxies from other target shareholders); see also Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985) (upholding pill's validity
because effect of pill upon proxy contests was minimal and there was little change
in governance structure of corporation).
135. See Lese, supra note 1, at 2203 (noting low risk of coercion in takeover
attempts).
136. See id. at 2204 (discussing reasons shareholders would not be coerced by
bidder's joint tender offer).
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pose that could justify the abandonment of the shareholder electoral
franchise.
137
C. Dead Hand Poison Pills Violate Proportionality Standard
Finally, dead hand poison pills fail to meet the proportionality stan-
dards set forth in Unocal and Unitrin.1 3 8 Continuing director provisions
are coercive because a shareholder who favors a control transaction may
be forced into voting for incumbent directors because only incumbent di-
rectors have power to accomplish that transaction. 139 This coercion di-
rectly contradicts the rationale behind judicial validation of the poison
pill-protection of shareholder choice. 140 The dead hand poison pill is
also preclusive because an acquirer cannot maintain a proxy contest to
One reason shareholders would not elect an insurgent espousing an agenda
inconsistent with their own is that they do not face the prisoner's dilemma con-
fronting shareholders during a two-tiered tender offer. See id. (noting difference
between joint and two-tiered tender offers). Two-tiered tender offers are coercive
because shareholders who refuse to tender their shares risk receiving a lower pay-
ment at the back end of the transaction when they are frozen out. See id. In con-
trast, shareholders voting against a dissident's slate of directors face no detrimental
consequences. See id. (discussing reasons for absence of coercion in joint tender
offer).
A second reason shareholders are protected is that there is no risk that a
shareholder who does not support a tender offer will, through his or her igno-
rance or the insurgent's deception, vote for an insurgent who plans to commence
a tender offer. See id. (discussing reasons for absence of coercion in joint tender
offer). Federal rules governing proxy solicitations mandate that solicitors fully dis-
close all material information related to their solicitations. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14(a)-101 (1995) (requiring proxy statement to include information relating
to any "merger or consolidation of the registrant into or with any other person
.... [any] acquisition by the registrant... or the liquidation or dissolution of the
registrant").
137. See Lese, supra note 1, at 2203 (stating that justifications for dead hand
pills set forth by incumbent boards invariably lack substance):
Continuing directors provisions should be prohibited because other means of
defense that do not infringe the shareholders' franchise are available. See id. (ar-
guing against validity of dead hand provisions). For example, the company could
amend its certificate of incorporation or bylaws to permit a classified board. See id.
at 2204. Other defensive techniques include requiring cause for the removal of
directors, fixing the maximum number of directors and requiring a supermajority
vote to amend any of these changes. See id.
138. For discussion of the proportionality standard as set forth in Unocal and
rearticulated in Unitrin, see supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
139. See Lese, supra note 1, at 2207 (discussing coercive effect of dead hand
pills on shareholders).
Dead hand pills are coercive because they force shareholders to vote for the
incumbent board. See id. (discussing dead hand pill's effect of stripping sharehold-
ers of their legitimate voting rights). Without the incumbent board to redeem the
pill, shareholders cannot take advantage of a favorable merger transaction. See id.
(emphasizing importance of voting for incumbent board).
140. See Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985) (up-
holding validity of pill because its effect on proxy contests was minimal and its
impact on corporate governance structure was minor).
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the effect of the dead hand pill on shareholder voting and shareholder
power is extraordinary. 142 A defensive measure with these effects that vio-
lates fundamental ideas of shareholder power (whose only justification is
that it protects the shareholders from themselves) is not within the range
of reasonableness.143 Therefore, the Delaware Chancery Court was cor-
rect in ruling that the Toll Brothers complaint stated legally cognizable
claims because the dead hand provision was an unreasonable defensive
measure. 1
4 4
V. IMPACT
The Delaware Chancery Court's analysis of dead hand poison pills
entails potentially far-reaching consequences for the market in corporate
control.1 45 The Carmody decision is important because Delaware, the cor-
porate home to more than sixty percent of Fortune 500 companies, is con-
sidered to be the leader in corporate jurisprudence.1 46 Shareholder
141. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 541 (stating that dead hand pill is preclu-
sive because it makes hostile bid "realistically unattainable"). In fact, "[t]he ac-
quirer's only alternative is to elect a partial slate of replacement directors, and to
hope that this shareholder signal combined with the new directors' boardroom
persuasiveness will change the minds of a sufficient number of continuing direc-
tors." Id. Otherwise no transaction will be possible. See id. (discussing preclusive
effect of dead hand poison pills). The unsolicited transaction becomes possible
only upon expiration of the poison pill. See id. Presumably a board could "re-
fresh" the pill at any time before being voted out of office. See id. at 531 (noting
ability of board to extend poison pill indefinitely). Such an action, including the
duration of the pill, should be subject to separate scrutiny under UnocaL See id. at
541 (discussing appropriate standard of review for dead hand poison pills).
142. See id. at 542 (referring to dead hand pill's disenfranchisement effect,
distortion of shareholder voting and inhibition of hostile bids as extraordinary).
143. See id. (discussing dead hand pill's lack of reasonableness); see also Lese,
supra note 1, at 2207 (stating that preclusive and coercive characteristics of contin-
uing director provisions are beyond "range of reasonableness" mandated by
Unitrin).
144. See Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., No. 15983, 1998 WL 418896, at *13 (Del.
Ch.July 24, 1998) (holding that complaint stated legally sufficient claim that dead
hand provision violated Unocal).
145. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 511 (stating that use and limits of poison
pill entail potentially far-reaching consequences for market in corporate control
because use of poison pills "affects not only scenarios that emerge after making of
a hostile bid, but pre-bid strategy as well, including initial decision whether to
make bid").
Decisions upholding dead hand poison pills would have a devastating impact
on the market for corporate control and would have large scale economic effects.
See id. at 531 (discussing long-term effects of dead hand pills); Lese, supra note 1, at
2211 (stating that upholding dead hand poison pill would cause misallocation of
control between board of directors and shareholders).
146. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Corporate Update: Mergers and
Acquisitions, NEw YoRK L.J., Nov. 19, 1998, at 5 (recognizing Delaware's preemi-
nence in corporate jurisprudence); Jef Feeley, Dead Hand Pills Being Dropped, NA-
nONAL L.J., Nov. 9, 1998, at B2 (noting approximate percentage of Fortune 500
companies incorporated in Delaware).
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activists and institutional investors will focus on dead hand provisions as
they work to persuade companies to remove or modify their poison
pills. 14 7 In fact, as a result of Carmody, many corporations have removed
the dead hand provision from their poison pills. 148 Otherwise, these com-
panies would face a high risk of an expensive lawsuit over the validity of
their dead hand provision. 149 In the meantime, it simply remains to be
seen whether other states will follow the approach of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, and rule that there is no life after death for corporate
directors. 1
50
Michael B. Regan
147. See Thomas E.L. Dewey, Loosening the Grip of the "Dead Hand", WALL ST.J.,
Aug. 24, 1998, at A12 (discussing impact of decision on shareholder activists and
institutional investors).
For example, the "Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Re-
tirement Equities Fund, a $240 billion teachers' pension fund .... is combing its
portfolio of 2,600 companies looking for those with dead hand provisions." See
Feeley, supra note 146, at B2 (discussing assault on dead hand poison pills). Fund
officials plan to put corporate resolutions seeking to drop the defense before
shareholders of companies with dead hand pills. See id.
148. See Block & Hoff, supra note 146, at 5 (stating that many corporations
have voluntarily amended their rights plans to eliminate dead hand provision fol-
lowing Carmody); Feeley, supra note 146, at B2 (stating that most of corporations
that have dropped dead hand pill are registered in Delaware).
149. See Feeley, supra note 146, at BI (discussing risks associated with dead
hand poison pills).
150. See Dewey, supra note 147, at A12 (stating that Carmody may prove to be
persuasive precedent in courts in other states due to influence of Delaware courts
and forcefulness of court's opinion).
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